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        In this paper, we identify the common organizational and institutional factor behind
the success and failure of the Japanese economy, focusing on the industrial policy and
the government-firm relationship.  The key concept is the bureau-pluralism. The
bureau-pluralism in Japan is an outcome of path dependent evolution of the economic
system.  Based on the experiences during WWII, the bureau-pluralistic system,
including deliberative councils and industrial associations, evolved, which worked
efficiently to coordinate economic growth in 1950’s and the high growth era.
Its effectiveness was supported by the condition that industries were highly
complementary in this period.  Consequently, on one hand, there were few serious
conflicts among industries and their counterparts in the bureaucracy, which made it
possible to avoid the bad influence of the conservative bias, due to the vested interests
of the existing industries.   On the other hand, this complementarity was sources of
numerous coordination failures in the various aspects of the economy.   In order to
detect and resolve these coordination failures quickly, the decentralized decision making
and horizontal coordination of the bureau-pluralism worked efficiently.
However, the same attribute of the bureau-pluralism impeded the Japanese
economy to adapt to the change of the global economy since 1980’s.  First, the newly
growing industrial fields as information and telecommunication, were across the border
of existing industries and therefore the bureaucratic jurisdiction, which caused serious
jurisdiction disputes among ministries.  Second, the reforms necessary to adapt to the
global change collided with the interests of the existing industries and ministries.
Those jurisdiction disputes and the conflicts with the vested interests are difficult for the
bureau-pluralism to resolve.1
Introduction
     The Japanese economy has been attracting attentions of the economists and
practitioners since the beginning of 1990’s.  In early 1990’s, its success was regarded
as  a core of the “East Asian Miracle,” and contributed to revising the orthodox
neoclassical view on the development policy (World Bank[1993]).  The industrial
policy was granted citizenship, while the deliberative council was evaluated as a device
to facilitate information exchange between the government and the private sector.
     On the other hand, in late 1990’s, under the prolonged depression and financial
crisis, Japan’s economic system was faced with severe criticism.  Government
intervention and regulation have been regarded as sources of inefficiency, and the
deliberative council has come to be considered as a hotbed of the notorious “iron
triangle,” composed of the political, bureaucratic and business societies.
     However, the events in 1990’s does never throw away the meaning of the long
experiences of the high growth the east Asian economies, including the Japanese
economy (Stiglitz[1999]).    We should have a consistent framework which can explain
both of the high growth until 1980’s and the stagnation in 1990’s.  In this paper, we
intend to make clear the common organizational and institutional factor behind the
success and failure of the Japanese economy, focusing on the industrial policy and the
government-firm relationship.
          The key concept of this paper is “bureau-pluralism” (Aoki[1988], chapter 7).    In
the bureau-pluralistic state, private interests are primarily aggregated by each industrial
association, and are transmitted to its counterpart in the bureaucracy, namely the
“original bureau” (genkyoku), which is in charge of the industry.  The original bureau
bargains one another inside the government, representing the interests of the industry
under its jurisdiction.  The bargaining is at first carried out within each ministry, then
across the ministries. This system is pluralistic in the sense that the people participate in
the policy making.  At the same time, it is bureaucratic, in the sense that the interests
of the people are represented by the bureaucrats.    As discussed in the following section,
the efficacy of the bureau-pluralism depends upon the environmental condition, and the
change of the environmental condition is one of the major explanatory factors of the
success and failure of the Japanese economy.
     The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 characterizes the organizational2
aspect of the Japanese government-firm relationship, focusing on the organization and
composition of the deliberative councils, and also summarizes its historical origin.
Section 3 describes the function of the bureau-pluralism in early 1950’s and high
growth era, focusing on the cases of the industrial rationalization and provision of
industrial infrastructure.  In section 4, we discuss the conditions which enabled the
good performance of the bureau-pluralism until the high growth era, and also examine
the change of the condition in 1980’s, focusing on the case of information and
telecommunication industry.    Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Organizational aspect of the bureau-pluralism and its historical origin
          The bureau-pluralistic nature of the Japanese political economy is reflected in the
organization and composition of the deliberative council.    To examine it, let me focus
on the case of the Industrial Structure Council, under the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI).    The Industrial Structure Council was established in 1964,
as a successor of the Council for Industrial Rationalization, which is mentioned in the
next section.  The Industrial Structure Council is “a permanent organization which
investigate and deliberates on basic issues related to Japan’s industrial structure” (MITI
[1994], p.182).
     The organization of the Industrial Structure Council in 1970, a year close to the
end of high growth era, is illustrated in Figure 1.    There were nineteen branches, seven
of which were organized by industry.  Table 1 shows the composition of the
committee members in 1970.    The members are classified according to their positions
written in the Council’s membership list, which reflected MITI’s perception at that time.
The Industrial Structure Council was a large deliberative council with five hundred and
five members.  One hundred and eight of them (21.3%) were the representatives,
namely, the chairmen, vice-chairmen, secretaries etc., of the industrial associations.
Most of them participated in the branches of the Council which related to their
industries.  For example, the representatives of the Japan Iron and Steel Association
and the Japan Machinery Industry Federation were appointed to be the members of the
Heavy Industries Branch.
The background of this organizational structure is the characteristics of the
Japanese industrial organization that the industrial associations were organized in most3
of the industries.  MITI [1970b] listed up all of the industrial associations under its
jurisdiction.  The total number of the industrial associations under MITI was as large
as five hundred and twenty eight (Table 2).  Those bureaus which were in charge of
individual industries, namely  the original bureaus (genkyoku), controlled large
number of industrial associations.
Remarkably, the bureau pluralism is historically not very deep rooted in the
Japanese political economy.    Although there were also deliberative councils in prewar
period, their memberships were substantially different from those of their postwar
counterparts.    Table 3 shows the memberships of the three major deliberative councils
in prewar period (The Economic Council, The Council of the Commerce and Industry,
The Temporary Industrial Council).
Not only the number of the members was much smaller than the postwar
counterparts, but the composition was also different.    First, the members included few
representatives of the industrial associations.  Second, the ratio of the representatives
of the organizations across industries, such as zaibatsu and chambers of commerce, was
high.    Third, the members included many diet members.
The former two characteristics suggest that the mode of aggregating private
interests differed in the prewar period from that in the postwar period.  The interests
were mainly aggregated by the geographical area (the chambers of commerce) or the
networks based on ownership (zaibatsu).  The third characteristics suggests that a
large part of the coordination, which has been carried by the bureaucracy in the postwar
period, was carried by the diet.    In other words, the role of the politicians was larger in
prewar Japan.
As other aspects of the Japan’s economic system, the government-firm
relationship was deeply affected by the experiences during the Second World War
(Okazaki[1993a]; Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara[1999]).  The Sino-Japanese War,
which broke out in 1937, forced the Japanese government to mobilize huge resources
for the war.  The government intended to carry out the mobilization thorough the
mechanism of planning and control.  In 1939, a system of the economic plans,
composed of the Materials Mobilization Plan, the Foreign Trade Plan, the Fund Control
Plan, the Labor Mobilization Plan, and Production Capacity Expansion Plan, was
established.  Unlike the postwar long-term economic plans in Japan, those wartime4
plans were implemented by the economic controls endorsed by such laws as the
National Mobilization Law.
In order to manage the planned economy, the government heavily made use of the
industrial associations.    From 1941 to 1942, twenty two control associations (toseikai)
were established by industry (Table 4).  Okazaki[1988] documented the function of
the Iron and Steel Control Association in detail, using the original documents of itself
and the government.  The Iron and Steel Control Association participated in making
the Materials Mobilization Plan, the short-term plan for resource allocation,
cooperating with the Planning Board.
In drawing up the Material Mobilization Plan, the Planning Board instructed a
single strategic variable, namely total allocation of the bottoms of ships, to the Control
Association.    Concerning the Japanese war economy at that time, the bottoms of ships
were the most binding condition for production level (Hara[1989]).  The Planning
board controlled this single variable, and the Control Association drew up concrete
production plan, given that variable.
In this procedure, local information specific to each industry was exclusively
processed by the Control Association, and it was reflected in the governmental plan
through the Control Association’s draft plans.  This is a mechanism similar to the
Material Balance Method of the Socialist Soviet Union (Aoki [1970]).    The capability
and position of the industrial associations rose substantially through the experiences
during the war, which came to be a initial condition of the postwar Japanese political
economy.
When the war ended in 1945, the Japanese government intended to give a major
part of its power to the control associations or their successors.    Although this scheme
itself was not realized, because of the anti-monopoly policy of the American occupation
authority, the successors of the control associations continued to support the planning
and control by the government in late 1940’s.  It is notable that not a few of the
executives of the control associations came to be those of the postwar counterparts
(Yonekura[1999], pp.195-196).  The early stage of the Japan’s postwar recovery was
achieved through the system of the planning and control, which built in the industrial
associations.    The well-known priority production policy was also carried out through
this system.5
In 1948, the Japanese government started to examine the long-term strategy for
the transition to a market economy and the economic recovery.  For this purpose, the
government established the Committee for the Economic Recovery Plan, the first major
deliberative council after the war.  The organization of the Committee was illustrated
in Figure 2.  There were four branches organized by industry, namely mining and
manufacturing, foods and necessities, international trade, and transportation.  The
former two branches, in turn, were composed of several subcommittees which were
also organized by industry.
In many cases, the chairmen of the relating industrial associations were appointed
as the chairmen of those branches and subcommittees.  For example, as the chairmen
of the Energy, Machinery and Metal, Textile, and Chemical Subcommittees, the
chairmen of the Japan Coal Association, the Japan Iron and Steel Association, the Japan
Cotton Spinning Association, and the Japan Chemical Industries Association, were
appointed respectively.
The ratio of the representatives of the industrial associations to the total members was
almost 20%, which was the highest next to that the bureaucrats (Table 5). This
characteristics of the Committee’s organizational structure was similar to that of the
Industrial Structure Council in 1970, described above.
3. Coordination of the economic growth
Industrial rationalization
     In 1949, the Japanese economy was transformed into a market economy, in
accordance with the instruction of the American occupation authority.  Most of the
economic controls and subsidies were abolished.  On the other hand, the role of
government continued to be substantial (Okazaki[1996]).
     The Japanese economy, just after the transformation, was faced with serious
coordination failure.  In those days, a wide consensus had been already formed
concerning the long-term prospect of the Japanese economy, through the discussion at
the Committee for the Economic Recovery Plan etc..    That is, the major driving force
of the Japanese economy should be the growth of the machinery industry based on
export.    It was because newly developing Asian countries would catch up in the textile
industry, which had been the Japan’s leading industry in prewar period.  The6
machinery industry was expected to absorb redundant labor forces and to earn foreign
currencies.
However, the Japanese machinery industry at that time, did not have enough
competitiveness in the international market.  The major reason was the high price of
the iron and steel.    The high price of the iron and steel, in turn, resulted partly from the
high prices of the coal and iron ore, and partly from the small scale of the iron and steel
production.  Furthermore, the high price of the iron ore resulted from the high freight
cost, which, in turn, was caused by the high price of the ship, a kind of machinery.
Also, the small scale of the iron and steel production was due to the condition that the
machinery industry had not developed.
In short, the machinery industry, the future leading industry, was uncompetitive,
because of the multiple factors across several industries.  Therefore, the machinery
industry could not became competitive only by the efforts of itself, not to speak of, by
the efforts of each machinery company.  Also, uncompetitiveness of the machinery
industry, in turn, checked the development of the iron and steel industry.    This vicious
cycle can be interpret as a coordination failure.
The central role of the Council for Industrial Rationalization, established under
MITI in 1949, the second major deliberative council after the war, was to resolve this
coordination failure.    The Council was composed of twenty nine branches by industry,
the Coordination Branch, and the General Branch.  The results of the branches by
industry were reported to the Coordination Branch to be coordinated.  Like the
Committee for Economic Recovery Plan, the representatives of the industrial
associations occupied a large part of the Council members.  Thirty of the total one
hundred and eighteen members (25%) were the chairmen, secretary etc. of the industrial
associations (Table 5).
In 1949 and 1950, the Council concentrated into the discussion at the Iron and
Steel Branch and the Coal Branch, in order to cope with the above mentioned
coordination failure.  The Iron and Steel branch examined the level of the coal price
which was necessary to make the iron and steel industry competitive, on the condition
that the iron and steel industry itself carried out the new investment to enhance
efficiency.  It thought that the coking coal price should be lower than 2,800 yen/ton.
At the same time, the Coal Branch examined the prospect of the coal price decrease,7
which would be achieved by the new investment in the coal mines.    It thought that the
coal mining cost could be cut by 18%.    However, the coking coal price would be still
3,700 yen/ton.    The interim conclusions were pessimistic.
The interim conclusions of the two branches were reported to the Coordination
Branch, which reexamined them.  Consequently it found that the upper limit of the
coking coal price could be raised to 3,200-3,300 yen/ton, if such conditions as the iron
and steel production was concentrated into the relatively efficient plants and the crude
oil was used together as a fuel.  Also, it found that the coking coal price would be
3,200-3,300 yen, in case the coal production was concentrated into the relatively
efficient mines and decrease of the interest rate of the loan of the Reconversion Finance
Bank, a public financial institution for the economic recovery.  The Coordination
Branch wrote down this conclusion in its final report to the Minister of International
Trade and Industry, which was determined by the Cabinet in August 1950.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Transportation (MOT), which was in charge of the
shipbuilding industry, organized the Research Committee on Steel for Shipbuilding,
with the Economic Stabilization Board.  It specified that in order for the Japanese
ships to be competitive with the European ships, the price of the steel for shipbuilding
would have to fall to below 27,000 yen/ton.  According to the Committee, this
condition could be met, if the price of steel plates became 24,090 yen/ton.  On the
other hand, thorough the examination at the Iron and Steel Branch of the Industrial
Rationalization Council, it was made clear that the price of steel plates would fall
approximately to that level.    In other words, along with the rationalization of the steel
and coal industry, rationalization of the shipbuilding industry would create the prospect
of the industry becoming internationally competitive.
     The story described above, implies that a path to get out of the vicious cycle,
namely a certain amount of simultaneous new investment supported by some
government policies, was found out, and the government committed to that policy
through the determination of the Cabinet.  This induced the aggressive investment
plans of the iron and steel companies in 1950 and 1951.  These plans were compiled
by MITI as the First Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan.    Table 6 shows the movement
of the investment by industry.  It is remarkable that the total investment increased in
1950, and that the ratio of the mining, metal and machinery industries rose sharply.    It8
is true that the increase in 1950 partly reflected the effect of the Korean War, but the
level of investment continued to be high after the armistice in 1951.
Supply of the basic materials and industrial infrastructure
     The industrial rationalization in early 1950’s boosted the Japanese economy into
the high economic growth.  However, soon after the high economic growth started in
1955, the basic materials and services, such as the steel, electricity and transportation,
came to be bottlenecks.  Especially, shortage of the steel impeded export of the
machinery.  This problem was resolved through the cooperation of MITI and the
related industrial associations.  Deliberating with the related industrial associations,
MITI determined the “Measures to Secure Steel for Machinery for Export” at the end of
1956 (MITI[1956]).  It aimed at “securing steel for exporting machinery at the stable
price, through the voluntary organization, based on the cooperation between the steel
industry and the machinery industry.”
          It prescribed that the steel industry should supply 25,000 tons of steel
preferentially to the exporting machinery every quarter.    This steel should be allocated
to each machinery company, based on the decision of the Screening Committees of the
Steel for Exporting Machinery, which was composed of the MITI bureaucrats and
persons of related industrial associations.
     Meanwhile, the iron and steel companies drew up the plans for expanding
equipment, referring to the Five Years Plan for Economic Independence, which was
determined by the Cabinet in December 1955.    These companies’ plans were compiled
by MITI as the Second Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan.  The focus of the Second
Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan was introducing basic oxygen furnaces (BOF) and
renovating blast furnaces (Lynn[1982]).  It implied that the Japanese steel industry
would substitute iron ore for scrap, on which it had heavily depended since prewar
period.  Therefore, in order to make the Plan effective, it was necessary to provide
simultaneously such infrastructure as the ore carriers and the port facilities for
unloading the iron ore.
     This coordination was also achieved in the bureau-pluralistic manner.  In early
1956, MITI drew up a document, “On the Direction of the Future Investment of the Iron
and Steel Industry,” which stressed the necessity of investing in the overseas iron ore
mines, the ore carriers and the port facilities (Heavy Industry Bureau, MITI [1963],9
pp.60-61).  Responding to the MITI’s proposal, the Committee of the Overseas Iron
Raw Materials, a private committee of the major iron and steel companies, requested
the Ministry of Transportation to construct fifteen ore carriers of 15,000 GT class
within five years.
          However, by the fact that the ore carrier was specialized in the iron ore, a typical
hold-up problem took place.  Once the ore carriers were built, the iron and steel
companies could hold up the shipping companies, and the shipping companies,
expecting the hold up, were not ready to built the ore carriers.  This problem was
resolved thorough the negotiation by the industrial associations of the steel and the
shipping industries, MITI, and MOT.  The iron and steel companies established the
Japan Ore Transportation Co., which shared the ore carriers with shipping companies
(Tekko Shinbunsha[1957], pp.84-85; Tekko Shinbunsha [1959], p.8, p.69; Heavy
Industry Bureau, MITI [1963], p.323).
Meanwhile, the Japan Iron and Steel Association established the Committee for
Port Preparation, and petitioned the government authorities and the parties to set up the
Special Account for Emergent Preparation of the Ports for the Specific Industries
(Japan Iron and Steel Association[1957]).    MOT came to share the idea.    The MOT’s
Bureau of Port considered that the port capacity restricted the economic growth, and
that it was necessary to prepare the ports for such industries as iron and steel, petroleum,
coal etc. (Japan Iron and Steel Association[1957]).  In August 1958, the Cabinet
determined  “On Preparation of the Major Ports to Cope with the Growth of
International Trade,” which aimed to set up a special account for preparing the ports for
the iron and steel and the petroleum (Tekko Shinbunsha [1959], pp.178-180; Heavy
Industry Bureau, MITI [1963], pp.324-325).
Owing to the Second Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan supported by those
infrastructure, the production cost of the Japan’s iron and steel industry decreased to be
lower than that of the US iron and steel industry in late 1950’s (Yamawaki[1984],
p.263), which, in turn, came to be the basis of competitiveness of Japan’s machinery
industry.  The bureau-pluralistic coordination resolved the bottlenecks in the basic
materials and the infrastructure, which sustained the high economic growth.
4. Transition of the environmental conditions and policy mismanagement10
     As described in the previous section, the bureau-pluralistic system worked to
coordinate the Japanese economic growth since 1950’s.  What conditions enabled the
high performance of the bureau-pluralism ?  And, how did those conditions come to
be after that ?  These questions are fundamental to understand the success and failure
of the Japanese economy from 1950’s to 1990’s.
     The bureau-pluralism is a highly decentralized system.  First, the power of
decision making is distributed to each original bureau, which is in charge of each
industry, and its counterpart in the business society.    Second, the substantial part of the
coordination among the original bureaus are executed horizontally.  In other words, it
lacks powerful central unit (headquarters), which coordinates the activities of the units
on the lower level of the hierarchy.
          These characteristics are the source of both the advantage and disadvantage of the
bureau-pluralism.  The advantage is that it can quickly incorporate rich local
information scattered around the industries into the government policy (Aoki[1988],
pp.284-285).  In early 1950’s, existence of the coordination failure in the coal, steel
and machinery industries, was precisely recognized, and the appropriate coordination
measures were took to resolve it.  In the high growth era, various bottlenecks were
quickly detected and resolved.
     On the other hand, the bureau-pluralism tends to be conservative.  Because
decision making is decentralized to each original bureau, it is difficult for a radical
policy against the interest of the original bureau and the industry under its jurisdiction
to be drawn up and implemented.  In other words, the bureau-pluralism is a system,
which is inclined to protect the vested interests of the existing industries and
bureaucrats.
     Efficacy of the bureau-pluralism depends upon relative importance of these
advantage and disadvantage, which, in turn, depends upon the environmental conditions.
The environmental conditions in 1950’s and 1960’s Japan were favorable for the
bureau-pluralism.  Those cases in the previous section suggest that complementarity
among industries was pervasive in this period.  In early 1950’s, the coal, steel and
machinery industries were highly complementary one another.  Also, in late 1950’s,
steel, machinery and transportation were complementary.
     In this situation, one industry’s interests were also the other industries’ interests.11
Therefore, there were few serious conflicts among industries, and the vested interests
were not so harmful to the economic growth.    It is true that such declining industry as
coal mining and agriculture (rice) were protected by the government, but the protection
could be easily bypassed by import of substitutive goods, namely petroleum and wheat.
In fact, the share of coal in the total energy supply and that of rice in the total food
supply declined sharply in 1950’s and 1960’s.
          At the same time, in the process of economic growth, numerous small problems,
namely coordination failures and bottlenecks etc., continuously took place in various
aspects of the economy.   In order to cope with those problems quickly, the bureau-
pluralism, in which the decision making was decentralized, was more efficient.
     However, the conditions has come to be substantially different since 1980’s.
The environmental change is well illustrated by the case of the information and
telecommunication industry.  It is widely recognized that the major driving force of
the high growth of the US. economy in 1990’s, is the advanced utilization of
information technology (IT) in wide-ranging areas of the economy.    Japan has been far
behind US. in this aspect, as shown in Table 7 (Oniki[1996], p.18; Kokuryo[1998],
p.353; Japan Federation of Economic Organizations[2000] ).
     The information and telecommunication industry is a new industry, which
emerged in 1980’s, fusing the computer, telecommunication and broadcasting
industries (Higashi [1999], pp.31-32).  In Japan, the computer has been under the
jurisdiction of MITI, and the telecommunication and broadcasting have been under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Postal Services (MPS).  When information and
telecommunication industry started to develop, the two ministries struggled severely
concerning its jurisdiction.  This struggle is one of the reasons why the provision of
the institutional and physical infrastructure of information and telecommunication has
been retarded in Japan.
          In 1984, MITI drew up a draft of the Law for Facilitating Information Processing,
which aimed at advanced utilization of the computer, security of the computer,
standardization of the information apparatus, protection of privacy.    At the same time,
MPS drew up a draft of the Law for Providing Infrastructure of Advanced
Telecommunication, the contents of which was almost the same as MITI’s draft.
MITI and MPS made efforts to adjust the two drafts, but eventually neither of them was12
realized (Kawakita[1985], pp.123-126).  In general, the jurisdiction struggle between
MITI and MPS, made it difficult for the Japanese government to implement consistent
policies regarding the information and telecommunication industry (Itami[1996],
p.210).
     The bureau-pluralistic coordination assumes the clear industry demarcation and
jurisdiction.  If this condition is not met, ministries tend to struggle for the
jurisdiction,
as in the case of the information and telecommunication industry, because expansion of
the jurisdiction is directly connected to the interests of the bureaucrats, thorough
allocation of budget and opportunity of dispatching ex-bureaucrats to the industries
(amakudari).  The industry demarcation problem is serious, because present growing
fields, such as biotechnology and environmental protection, are more or less across the
border of existing industries (Aoki[1999], p.24).
     Besides the jurisdiction struggle between MITI and MPS, another disadvantage
of the bureau-pluralism mattered concerning the retard of the Japanese information and
telecommunication industry.    As a result of the telecommunication reform in 1985, the
Telecommunication and Telephone Corporation was privatized to be NTT, and three
new common carriers were established.    This reform itself was epoch making, but the
problem is that the pace of the subsequent reform was terribly slow (Suzumura[1997],
p.31; Takigawa[1999], pp.178-181).
     After the reform in 1985, the discussion on telecommunication reform was
focused on the reorganization of NTT.  More than ten years had passed, when MPS
determined to divide NTT into two local companies and a company for long distance
telecommunication, in 1996.  Until then, the telecommunication reform hardly
progressed, and MPS continued the discretionary control over various aspects of the
telecommunication industry, namely, fee, new entry, and competition among NTT and
new common carriers .
          The bad influence of the retard of the reform was substantial.    According to the
MPS’s survey in 1997, communication fee for the exclusive circuit (1.5Mbps) in Tokyo
was 4.7 times as high as that in New York (Table 8).    The high telecommunication fee
checked the utilization of information technology by the Japanese companies.    Higashi
[1999] mentions the case of Kao Co., which is a major chemical company and famous13
for its progressive strategy to utilize information technology.  In 1998, Kao Co.
announced that it gave up a plan of remote control over all the plants scattered in Japan,
because of the high telecommunication cost (p.69).  Higashi[1999] discussed that if
the telecommunication cost in Japan had been the same as in US., Kao’s plan would
have been feasible.
     The reason why the telecommunication reform retarded, lies in the bureau-
pluralistic decision making.  The basic telecommunication policy was deliberated at
the Telecommunication Council under MPS. The deliberation concerning the
telecommunication reform was very time consuming, because the reform would directly
affect on the vested interests of the existing telecommunication companies and MPS
itself.  In this sense, the nature of the policy issues was different from that in 1950’s
and 1960’s, which made the conservative bias of the bureau-pluralism harmful.
5. Concluding Remarks
 We can identify the common institutional and organizational factor, namely the
bureau-pluralism, behind the success and failure of the Japanese economy from 1950’s
to 1990’s.  The bureau-pluralism in Japan is an outcome of path dependent evolution
of the economic system.  Based on the experiences during WWII, the bureau-
pluralistic system, including deliberative councils and industrial associations, evolved.
This system worked efficiently to coordinate economic growth in 1950’s and the high
growth era.
Its effectiveness was supported by the condition that industries were highly
complementary in this period.  Consequently, on one hand, there were few serious
conflicts among industries and their counterparts in the bureaucracy, which made it
possible to avoid the bad influence of the conservative bias, due to the vested interests
of the existing industries.   On the other hand, this complementarity was sources of
numerous coordination failures in the various aspects of the economy.   In order to
detect and resolve these coordination failures quickly, the decentralized decision
making and horizontal coordination of the bureau-pluralism worked efficiently.
However, the same attribute of the bureau-pluralism impeded the Japanese
economy to adapt to the change of the global economy since 1980’s.    First, the newly
growing industrial fields as information and telecommunication, were across the border14
of existing industries and therefore the bureaucratic jurisdiction, which caused serious
jurisdiction disputes among ministries.  Second, the reforms necessary to adapt to the
global change collided with the interests of the existing industries and ministries.
Those jurisdiction disputes and the conflicts with the vested interests are difficult for
the bureau-pluralism to resolve.   In this sense, the success and the failure of the
Japanese economy resulted from the same source.
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Source: MITI[1970a].Table2 Number of Industrial Associations under MITI's Jurisdiction (1970)
Total 528
Minister's Secretariat 1
International Trade Bureau 14
Trade and Development Bureau 76
Enterprise Bureau 20
Heavy Industry Bureau 137
Chenical Industry Bureau 74
Textile and Miscellaneous Industries Bureau 123
Mine and Coal Bureau 40
Mine Safety Bureau 2
Public Utilities Bureau 20
Patent Office 5
Smaller Enterprise Agency 9
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology 7
Source: MITI[1970b].Table 3 Membership of the Prewar Deliberative Councils
Economic Council Commerce and Industry CounciTemporary Industrial Council
Total 72 20 25 9 16 5
General Association 13 1 4 1 5 1
Industrial Association 11 0 0 2 0
Zaibatsu 6 0 3 1 2 1
Financial Institution 3 1 1 1 2 1
Industial Company 16 6 3 1 3 0
Public Company 3 1 1 1 0 0
Journalist 2 0 5 0 0 0
Labor Union 0 0 0 0 0 0
Academic 7 0 3 1 2 2
Diet Member 10 10 3 3 0 0
Bureaucrat 9 0 0 0 0 0
Others 2 0 2 0 0 0
Source: MITI[1961]; Jinji Koshinjo[1928], [1937].
Note: The numbers in the second colum of each council denote the persons who were the diet 
     members at the same time.Table 4 Control Associaitons and their Successors




Iron and Steel Control Associaiton 11/1941 Japan Iron and Steel Council 12/1945
Coal Control Association 11/1941 Japan Coal Association 5/1946
Mine Control Associaiton 12/1941 National Mine Association 3/1946
Cement Control Association 12/1941 Cement Industry Association n.a.
Rolling Stock Control Association 12/1941 Rolling Stock Industry Association 11/1945
Automobile Control Association 12/1941 Automobile Council 11/1945
Precision Machine Control Association 1/1942 Japan Machine Tool Association 1/1946
Electric Machinery Control Association 1/1942 Japan Electric Machinery Association 2/1946
Industrial Machine Control Association 1/1942 Industrial Machinery Association 3/1946
Metal Industry Control Association 1/1942 Japan Cable Association 11/1945
International Trade Control Association 1/1942 Japan International Trade Association n.a.
Shipbuilding Control Association 1/1942 Federation of Shipbuilding Associations 10/1945
Railways Control Association 5/1942 Japan Railways Association 12/1945
Light Metal Control Association 9/1942 Light Metal Council 10/1946
Wool Control Association 9/1942 Japan Textile Association 12/1945
Leather Control Association 9/1942 Leather Association 12/1945
Hemp Control Association 9/1942 Japan Textile Association 12/1945
Silk and Rayon Control Association 10/1942 Japan Textile Association 12/1945
Cotton and Staple Fiber Control Associatio 10/1942 Japan Textile Association 12/1945
Oils and Fats Control Association 10/1942 Oils and Fats Processing Associaiton 1/1946
Chemical Industry Control Association 10/1942 Chemical Industry Federation 3/1946
Rubber Control Association 1/1943 Rubber Association 12/1945
Source: Okazaki[1993b].t5
Table 5 Membership of the Economic Recovery Committee and the 






General Association 8 3
Industrial Association 77 30
Financial Institution 2 0
Industial Company 46 48
Public Company 28 8
Journalist 0 0
Labor Union 3 0
Academic 39 4
Diet Member 10 0
Bureaucrat 141 18
Others 23 7
Source: Secretary Office of the Economic Recovery Committee[1948];
     MITI[1949].
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Table 6 Investment by Industry
One million yen %
Total Mining Metal Machinery Total Mining Metal Machinery
1949 44,150 -2,720 1,930 -2,071 100.0 -6.2 4.4 -4.7
1950 544,358 4,470 61,470 27,251 100.0 0.8 11.3 5.0
1951 637,933 58,638 39,563 42,097 100.0 9.2 6.2 6.6
1952 485,280 25,429 48,591 34,072 100.0 5.2 10.0 7.0
1953 601,269 29,094 57,108 43,061 100.0 4.8 9.5 7.2
1954 1,002,384 46,229 72,652 94,940 100.0 4.6 7.2 9.5
1955 523,662 9,544 41,787 56,899 100.0 1.8 8.0 10.9
Source: Ministry of Finance, Hojin Kigyo Tokei Nenpo (Year Book of Company Statistics), various 
     issues.
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Table 7 Comparison of the Utilization of Information Technology
     for Industry between Japan and US. (1993/1994)
Magnification(US/Japan)
Equipment ratio of personal computer 4.7
Networking ratio of personal computer 3.9
Subscription ratio of computer telecommunication 1.3
Number of internet hosts 12.5
Equipment ratio of data base 1.4
Source: Ministry of Postal Services, Tsushin Hakusho (Telecomminication
     White Paper), 1996, p.264
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